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Based on measurements among 332 owner-managers, we investigate how the global shapeof the utility function (i.e., S-shaped versus concave or convex over the total range of
outcomes) relates to choice behavior. We ﬁnd that the global shape of the utility function
differs across decision makers (about one-third of the owner-managers exhibit an S-shaped
utility function) and that the global shape is linked to organizational behavior (i.e., the pro-
duction system employed), a result that does not change when using different methods to
identify the decision maker’s global shape of the utility function. The decision maker’s risk
attitude (risk averse or risk seeking) does not affect the choice of the production system.
Whereas the degree of risk aversion, based on the local shape of the utility function, may
be important in explaining owner-managers’ trading behavior (Pennings and Smidts 2000),
more structural organizational behavior appears to be linked to the global shape of the utility
function.
(Heterogeneity in Utility Functions; Organizational Behavior; S-Shaped Utility Function; Real
Decision Makers; Reference Points)
1. Introduction
In the expected utility (EU) model, the utility func-
tion ux describes the risk attitude of decision mak-
ers (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). The curvature of the
utility function ux reﬂects whether decision mak-
ers are risk averse (a concave utility function) or
risk seeking (a convex utility function). Local mea-
sures of the utility function curvature, such as the
well-known Pratt-Arrow coefﬁcient of risk aversion,
indicate how strongly decision makers exhibit their
risk attitude. A lot of research in decision making
under risk has focused on relating local measures of
risk aversion to choice behavior. Pennings and Smidts
(2000), for example, found that the degree of risk
aversion is important in explaining owner-managers’
trading behavior (i.e., the choice of relatively safe
ﬁxed-price contracts versus risky spot market transac-
tions). In this paper, however, we are interested in the
global shape of the utility function ux and how that
global shape relates to choice behavior. Global shape
is deﬁned here as the general shape of the utility func-
tion over the entire outcome domain: fully concave,
fully convex, or S-shaped (convex/concave).
An S-shaped utility function has been proposed
in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
In prospect theory, the shape of a decision maker’s
utility function is assumed to differ between the
domain of gains and the domain of losses. The
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proposed convex/concave utility function predicts
risk-seeking behavior in the domain of losses and
risk-averse behavior in the domain of gains. Evi-
dence for convex/concave utility functions across the
total outcome domain has been found by Fishburn
and Kochenberger (1979), Hershey and Schoemaker
(1980), Budescu and Weiss (1987), and Kuhberger
et al. (1999), among others.
In this paper, we conjecture that structural decision
behavior is more strongly linked to the global shape
of ux than to local measures of risk aversion. In par-
ticular, the occurrence of an S-shaped utility function
may imply fundamentally different behavior because
decision makers will code outcomes into gains and
losses, as compared to decision makers with fully con-
cave or fully convex utility functions, who do not
appear to think in terms of gains and losses.
Our objective is twofold. First, we analyze the
extent of heterogeneity in the global shape of the util-
ity function of real-business decision makers. Second,
we test whether the shape of the utility function
is linked to differences in organizational behavior.
Organizational behavior is operationalized here as the
owner-manager’s design of the production process.
We will show that the global shape of the utility func-
tion is related to organizational behavior, whereas the
local measure is not.
First, we empirically demonstrate the relationship
between the global shape of the utility function and
organizational behavior. Next, we discuss the causal
direction of this relationship: Is organizational behav-
ior driving the shape of the utility function or is it the
other way around?
2. Decision Context
To test the relationship between the shape of the
utility function and organizational behavior, a deci-
sion context is required that is not masked by situ-
ational variables and where the decision maker has
a prominent inﬂuence on the organizational form of
the ﬁrm. The decision context of Dutch hog farm-
ers meets these requirements. Dutch hog farmers are
owner-managers who determine how they organize
their ﬁrm and who are all exposed to the same eco-
nomic environment (i.e., the volatile cash market of
slaughter hogs). In hog farming, two production sys-
tems are distinguished: the “open production system”
(OPS) and the “closed production system” (CPS). In
the OPS, both piglets and feeds are bought; piglets are
raised to be slaughter hogs in three to four months
(during that period the hogs are fattened until their
slaughter weight is about 90 kilograms) and sold in
the cash market or through forward contracts. The
CPS is similar to the OPS, except that the owner-
manager breeds piglets instead of buying them.
A consequence of the chosen production system is
that owner-managers who choose the OPS are more
often and more explicitly confronted with input costs
than are managers who choose the CPS. In particu-
lar, the expense of buying piglets (the costliest input
in the production process) may make the input costs
more salient to the OPS managers, and thus may
affect their decision making and risk preferences. It
may induce them to think more often or more easily
in terms of gains and losses, with the costs of pro-
duction as a reference point. We therefore may expect
that OPS managers will be more inclined to think in
terms of gains and losses, and thus will more often
exhibit an S-shaped utility function. CPS managers,
on the other hand, are not naturally provided with a
reference point and are thus less stimulated to think
in gains and losses terms. We therefore may expect
that CPS managers will more often exhibit a fully con-
cave or fully convex utility function describing their
risk preferences.
3. Method
3.1. Assessing the Utility Function
We assessed the utility function of 332 hog farmers
by means of computer-guided interviews. The utility
function was measured using the certainty equiva-
lence method (Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Smidts 1997).
The certainty equivalents were obtained through
choice-based matching (Keeney and Raiffa 1976,
Fischer et al. 1999). In designing the lottery task for
the hog farmers, we took into account the research
ﬁndings on the sources of bias in assessment pro-
cedures for utility functions (Hershey et al. 1982,
Hershey and Schoemaker 1985, Tversky et al. 1988).
The main sources of bias arise when the assessment
does not match the subjects’ real decision situation.
An important decision for hog farmers to make on
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a regular basis concerns the selling strategy of their
slaughter hogs. They can choose a ﬁxed-price forward
contract or sell the hogs in the (risky) spot market.
The lottery task ﬁts this decision context, and the price
per kilogram live hog weight is the main attribute.
Another important research design issue involves the
dimensions of the lottery; that is, the probability and
outcome levels to be used in eliciting risk prefer-
ences. The outcome levels range from 2.34 to 4.29
Dutch guilder (1.06 Euro to 1.95 Euro) per kilogram
live weight, representing all price levels of slaugh-
ter hogs that have occurred in the last ﬁve years. We
chose a probability of 0.5 in the lotteries, express-
ing this stochastic nature of commodity prices (prices
can rise or fall with equal probability), because vari-
ous researchers have shown the stochastic behavior of
commodity prices (Schwartz 1997, Hilliard and Reis
1999).
The measurement procedure was computerized
and took about 20 minutes. The respondents were
given a choice between three alternatives: Alterna-
tive A was a 50/50 chance of receiving a relatively
high price or a relatively low price; Alternative B was
a ﬁxed price; and Alternative C indicated indiffer-
ence. The assessment of the certainty equivalent was
an iterative process. If the respondent chose Alter-
native A (the 50/50 high/low price), the computer
would generate a higher ﬁxed price (Alternative B)
than the previous one, thus making Alternative B
more attractive. If the respondent chose the ﬁxed
price (Alternative B), the computer would generate a
lower ﬁxed price the next time, thus making Alter-
native A (the 50/50 high/low price) more attrac-
tive. The choice between A and B was repeated until
the respondent chose C (indicating indifference), after
which a new lottery would start.
Nine points were assessed, corresponding to util-
ities of 0.125, 0.250, 0.375, 0.500, 0.625, 0.750, and
0.875 (plus two consistency measurements on utilities
0.500 and 0.625). For details on a similar elicitation
procedure, see Pennings and Smidts (2000). Further-
more, accounting data was available from the ﬁrms
involved, including information about their produc-
tion systems (OPS versus CPS).
3.2. Assessing the Shape of the Utility Function
To assess the shape of the utility function we apply
two different methodologies. This allows us to test the
robustness of our empirical results. If there is truly
a relationship between the shape of the utility func-
tion and the production system employed, both meth-
ods should yield the same result, ensuring that our
results are method invariant. In particular, we show
that the relationship between the shape of the utility
function and the choice of the production system does
not depend on the particular choice of the family of
utility curves ﬁtted to the assessed certainty equiva-
lents. Below we discuss the two methods.
3.2.1. Fitting a Continuous Function: The EXP-
IPT Method. In the ﬁrst method, henceforth referred
to as the EXP-IPT method, we ﬁt the observations
for each subject (the nine assessed certainty equiva-
lents) to both the negative exponential function (EXP)
and the log of the inverse power transformation func-
tion (IPT), the latter being an S-shaped utility func-
tion. The Appendix shows the function speciﬁcations.
The exponential function is fully concave or fully con-
vex over the entire outcome domain. The exponential
function is often used in empirical studies, as it meets
the general conditions of acceptable utility functions
speciﬁed by Arrow (Tsiang 1972). The IPT-function
speciﬁcation was selected to represent an S-shaped
utility function. The IPT function is quite ﬂexible as
regards the point of inﬂexion, which can be anywhere
between its upper and lower bounds. Moreover, the
IPT function offers wide variations in the degree of
symmetry for a given point of inﬂexion (Meade and
Islam 1995, Bewley and Fiebig 1988).1 Because it is the
certainty equivalents and not the utility levels that are
measured with error, the inverse functions are esti-
mated (Smidts 1997; see Appendix).
Based on the ﬁt (i.e., by means of a pairwise com-
parison of the Mean Squared Error (MSE)), we clas-
sify the farmers into two groups: the EXP group (fully
concave or convex utility function) and the IPT group
(S-shape utility function). Subsequently, we examine
the relationship between group membership and the
production system that they employ.
1 The authors are grateful to Nigel Meade and Towhidul Islam
for providing detailed information on the properties of the IPT
function.
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3.2.2. Two-Piece Utility Function Method. In the
second method to assess the shape of the utility func-
tion, we decompose the utility function into two expo-
nential segments, one for consequences above the
reference point (gain domain) and the other for conse-
quences below the reference point (loss domain). We
owe this idea to an anonymous reviewer. As a natural
reference point we took the average cost of produc-
tion, which was 2.90 Dutch guilder per kilogram live
weight (that is, approximately 1.31 Euro). Certainty
equivalents obtained from lotteries in which the rel-
atively high level of the lottery (xH) was below the
natural reference point (xH < xREF) were used to esti-
mate the EXP function for the loss segment, whereas
lotteries in which the relatively low level of the lottery
(xL) was above the natural reference point (xL > xREF)
were used to estimate the EXP function for the gain
segment. Certainty equivalents that were obtained
from lotteries in which xH was above the natural ref-
erence point and xL below the reference point (i.e.,
the range of the lottery includes the reference point:
xL < xREF < xH) were used in the estimation of both
segments.
Similar to estimating the EXP function for the
total outcome range, we normalized ux on a 0–1
scale. This was done for each segment sepa-
rately: uxLOWEST= 0 and uxREF = 1 for losses, and
uxREF= 0 and uxHIGHEST= 1 for gains. The utilities
of these separate segments are linked by scaling all
assessments relative to uxREF, calculated for the spe-
ciﬁc individual respondent. We estimated uxREF, i.e.,
u(2.90 Dutch guilder), on the basis of the best-ﬁtting
overall function (EXP or IPT) for that individual.
By estimating the EXP function for each segment,
we obtain two parameters for each respondent: cg for
the gain domain and cl for the loss domain (c in the
exponential function represents the Pratt-Arrow coef-
ﬁcient of absolute risk aversion). These parameters
allow us to describe the farmer’s shape of the utility
function as a combination of cg and cl. We can classify
farmers regarding four different shapes of the utility
function: cl > 0 and cg > 0 implying a concave utility
function for both gains and losses, cl < 0 and cg < 0
implying a fully convex utility function, cl > 0 and
cg < 0 implying a reversed S-shaped utility function,
and cl < 0 and cg > 0 implying an S-shaped function.
4. Heterogeneity in the Shape of
Utility Functions
The results for each method of assessing the shape of
the utility function will be presented ﬁrst, followed
by a discussion of the robustness of the classiﬁcation
of the farmers by comparing the two methods.
4.1. Results of the EXP-IPT Method
First, we assume the farmers to be homogeneous as
regards the shape of the utility function. We therefore
estimate both the exponential function and the IPT
function for each farmer (see Table 1, top panel).2
Parameter c in the exponential function represents
the Pratt-Arrow coefﬁcient of risk aversion. Based on
the exponential function, many farmers (55%) appear
to be risk averse (parameter c > 0), while others are
risk prone (c < 0), which is in line with previous ﬁnd-
ings (Pennings and Smidts 2000). The estimates of the
IPT function show that hog farmers, on average, have
an S-shaped (convex, concave) function (i.e., 
> k) in
the IPT function; see Appendix for speciﬁcation. The
estimates of the IPT function allow us to derive the
average point of inﬂexion for the IPT group, which
appears to be 2.93 Dutch guilder per kilogram live
weight hogs. This number corresponds closely to the
production costs of 2.90 Dutch guilder per kilogram,
as estimated by experts from the industry at the time
of the research. Table 2 provides information regard-
ing the distribution of the point of inﬂexion for the
IPT group.
Because both functions have three parameters and
are estimated with an equal number of data points for
each subject, we can compare the functions’ ﬁt on the
basis of the MSE. Table 1 shows that, on average, the
exponential function ﬁts the owner-managers’ utility
function slightly better than the IPT function.
To test for heterogeneity as regards the functional
form of their utility function, we split the owner-
managers in two groups, based on their ﬁt of
2 Two measurements at ux = 05 and two at ux = 0625 were
obtained to test the internal consistency of the assessments. When
tested, the differences between the assessed certainty equivalents
for the same utility levels were not signiﬁcant (p > 099 (pairwise
test)) for both consistency measurements, indicating that respon-
dents assessed the certainty equivalents in an internally consistent
manner.
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Table 1 Results of Estimating the Utility Function per Individual for the
Exponential Function and the IPT Function: The Homogeneous
and Heterogeneous Cases
Estimation results for the homogeneous case (n = 332)
Exponential function IPT function
a b c   
Parametera
Mean −1486 1461 −0283 −3973 9680 0954
Median −0007 0016 0053 −4094 7227 −0159
Fit indicesb	 c
Mean MSE 0005 0008
Median MSE 0003 0005
Mean R2 0907 0871
Median R2 0928 0886
Estimation results for the heterogeneous case
n = 229 n = 103
Parameter
Mean −2276 2296 −0124 −4480 10384 1071
Median −0031 0042 0053 −4569 6673 −0446
Fit indices
Mean MSE 0004 0002
Median MSE 0002 0002
Mean R2 0957 0956
Median R2 0974 0969
Notes. aFor function speciﬁcations, see Appendix. bMSE = Mean Squared
Error (predicted versus observed certainty equivalents, scaled on a 0–1
scale). cR2 is calculated by squaring the Pearson correlation between the
actual values and the values predicted from the model.
the two functions. One group consisted of owner-
managers whose utility function is best described by
the exponential function (the so-called EXP group;
n= 229); the other group consisted of subjects whose
function is best described by the S-shaped function
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics on the Point of Inﬂexion
in Dutch Guilders per Kilogram Live Weight
for the IPT Group
Point of inﬂexion based on the






(the so-called IPT group; n= 103), based on the pair-
wise comparison of the MSE. Table 1 (lower panel)
presents the estimation results for both groups. A
comparison of the estimation results from the homo-
geneous case with those from the heterogeneous
case shows that the average ﬁt for both functions
has increased and that the parameter estimates have
changed substantially by taking heterogeneity into
account. In particular, the mean MSE of the IPT func-
tion drops from 0.008 for the total group to 0.002 for
the 103 IPT subjects (see also the substantial increase
in R2). For the EXP group, the increase in ﬁt is less
dramatic but still evident (see, e.g., R2). The split is
deﬁnitely not random, as the MSE and the param-
eters of the exponential function differ signiﬁcantly
between the “real” EXP group and the “real” IPT
group (all p < 005); similar results were found for
MSE and parameters of the well-ﬁtting and badly ﬁt-
ting IPT subjects.
These results show that owner-managers differ
regarding the global shape of their utility function.
Next, we examine the global shape of the utility
function using the two-piece utility function method,
allowing us to determine whether or not the results
of the EXP-IPT method are robust.
4.2. Results of the Two-Piece Utility
Function Method
Table 3 shows the results for the two-piece utility
function method. The estimation results indicate that
38.8% (n = 129) of the farmers have utility functions
that are concave for both the loss and gain domains
(i.e., cl > 0 and cg > 0), and hence are said to be risk
averse across the total outcome domain. A smaller
group of farmers (27.4%) can be described as being
risk prone across the entire outcome domain (i.e.,
cl < 0 and cg < 0). Only a few farmers (3.6%) show
a reversed S-shaped utility function (i.e., cl > 0 and
cg < 0). About 30% of the farmers exhibit an S-shaped
utility function. These results conﬁrm our previous
ﬁnding that owner-managers differ regarding the
global shape of their utility function. Furthermore,
our observation that decision makers differ regard-
ing the global shape of their utility function conﬁrms
the work done by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979),
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Table 3 Results of the Two-Piece Utility Function Method
Loss domain Gain domain
Parametera al bl cl ag bg cg
Estimates for farmers who exhibit a concave utility function cl > 0 and cg > 0 n = 129388%
Mean 2548 −2560 2317 3585 −3636 2161
Median 1117 −1205 2182 1129 −1287 2059
Median MSE 0003 0003
Median R2 0963 0962
Estimates for farmers who exhibit convex utility function cl < 0 and cg < 0 n = 91; 274%
Mean −5851 5854 −2437 −5355 5341 −1738
Median −0371 0135 −2131 −0344 0346 −1437
Median MSE 0007 0003
Median R2 0956 0969
Estimates for farmers who exhibit a reversed S-shaped utility function cl > 0 and cg < 0 n = 1236%
Mean 4213 −4232 1641 −0487 0477 −2605
Median 1271 −1288 1444 −0078 0087 −2694
Median MSE 0000 0005
Median R2 0961 0968
Estimates for farmers who exhibit an S-shaped utility function cl < 0 and cg > 0 n = 100301%
Mean −0359 0364 −2509 3911 −3928 1956
Median −0096 0105 −2449 1205 −1349 1741
Median MSE 0002 0003
Median R2 0969 0967
Notes. aAn exponential function is estimated separately for gains and losses; for function speciﬁcation, see
Appendix. bMSE = Mean Squared Error (predicted versus observed certainty equivalents, scaled on a 0–1 scale).
cR2 is calculated by squaring the Pearson correlation between the actual values and the values predicted from the
model.
who used a two-piece utility function method with
30 respondents. They also found all four shapes of
utility functions, and 46% of their subjects exhibited
an S-shaped function.
The results in Table 3 allow us to measure the loss
aversion of the farmers by examining the ratio of the
slope of the utility function in the loss domain and
the slope in the gain domain (Kahneman et al. 1990,
Tversky and Kahneman 1991). For the farmers with
an S-shaped utility function the average loss-aversion
coefﬁcient is 1.8, indicating that risk preferences are
exhibited somewhat more strongly for losses than for
gains. The average loss aversion of our subjects is
somewhat smaller than the loss-aversion coefﬁcients
found in other studies, which are in the neighborhood
of 2 (Kahneman et al. 1990, Tversky and Kahneman
1991).
4.3. Method Comparison: Robustness of
Classiﬁcation
To examine whether the EXP-IPT method and the
two-piece utility function method identify similar
Table 4 Correspondence in Classiﬁcation of the EXP-IPT Method and
the Two-Piece Utility Function Method
The EXP-IPT method
EXP function IPT function
Two-piece utility
function method
Concave function 969% n= 125 31% n = 4
(cl > 0 and cg > 0)
Convex function 956% n= 87 44% n = 4
(cl < 0 and cg < 0)
Reversed S-shaped function 250% n = 3 750% n = 9
(cl > 0 and cg < 0)
S-shaped function 140% n= 14 860% n= 86
(cl < 0 and cg > 0)
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global shapes of the utility function, we compare the
two methods. Table 4 shows the high correspondence
in classiﬁcation. Farmers who have a fully (i.e., over
the total outcome range) concave or convex utility
function according to the two-piece utility function
method are farmers that were best described by
an EXP-utility function according to the EXP-IPT
method. That is, 96.9% of the farmers that have
a fully concave utility function (cl > 0 and cg > 0)
and 95.6% of the farmers that have a fully convex
utility function (cl < 0 and cg < 0) are farmers for
whom the EXP function ﬁts best. Farmers that have
an S-shaped or reversed S-shaped utility function
according to the two-piece utility function method
are farmers that have an IPT-utility function accord-
ing to the EXP-IPT method. That is, for 75% of the
farmers with a reversed S-shaped utility function and
86.0% of the farmers with an S-shaped utility func-
tion, the IPT function ﬁts best. These results show
that classifying respondents as regards the shape of
the utility function is not dependent on the method
used, providing evidence that the identiﬁcation of
the global shape of the utility function for farmers is
robust.
5. Shape of the Utility Function
and Organizational Behavior
After showing heterogeneity in the shape of the util-
ity function of real-business decision makers, we
investigate whether the shape of the utility function
is reﬂected in the decision maker’s organizational
behavior using both methods to identify the global
shape of the decision maker’s utility function.
5.1. Shape Identiﬁed by the EXP-IPT
Method and Organizational Behavior
We examine whether or not the production system
chosen by hog farmers (OPS versus CPS) is related
to the shape of their utility function (EXP versus
IPT). Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the
relationship.
Table 5 shows that the functional form of a hog
farmer’s global utility function (EXP versus IPT) is
related to the production system employed (OPS ver-
sus CPS). Overall, 45.5% of the farmers employed the
Table 5 Relationship Between the Shape of the Utility Function (IPT
vs. EXP) and Production System Employed (OPS vs. CPS)
for the Total Sample and the Risk-Averse and Risk-Seeking
Segments
OPS % CPS % Total %
Total 455 545 100 n = 332
EXP group 297 703 100 n = 229
IPT group 806 194 100 n = 103
Total 100 100 100 n = 332 
EXP group 45.0 89.0 69 n = 229 
IPT group 55.0 11.0 31 n = 103 
Risk-averse decision makers (c > 0; n = 183)
EXP group 292 708 100 n = 120
IPT group 809 191 100 n = 63
Risk-seeking decision makers (c < 0; n = 149)
EXP group 284 716 100 n = 109
IPT group 800 200 100 n = 40
Notes. Where the EXP group consists of respondents for whom the shape
of their utility function is best described by the exponential function (fully
concave or fully convex), the IPT group consists of respondents for whom
the shape of their utility function is best described by the log of the inverse
power transformation function (S-shaped; see Appendix for function speciﬁ-
cations). OPS denotes the open production system, CPS denotes the closed
production system, and c is the risk parameter in the exponential function.
OPS production system and 54.5% employed the CPS
system. Of the farmers with a concave or convex util-
ity function (the EXP group), 29.7% employed OPS
and 70.3% employed CPS. In contrast, of the farm-
ers with an S-shaped utility function (the IPT group),
80.6% employed OPS, while 19.4% used CPS. Look-
ing at these same results from an opposite direction,
Table 5 (percentages in italics) shows the majority of
the farmers that employ the OPS production system
(those who buy piglets) have utility functions that are
best described by the S-shaped IPT function (55.0%
versus 45.0%). In contrast, hog farmers that employ
CPS (those who breed their own piglets) have utility
functions that are best described by the EXP function
(89.0% versus 11.0%).
To check whether a fundamental difference exists
between risk-averse and risk-seeking decision mak-
ers, Table 5 (lower panel) also includes the relation-
ship between the shape of the utility function (IPT
versus EXP) and the production system employed
(OPS versus CPS) for both risk-averse (c > 0) and
risk-seeking decision makers (c < 0). The relationship
between the global shape of the utility function and
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the production system employed turns out to be simi-
lar for both segments. Thus, whether a decision maker
is risk averse or risk seeking does not seem to affect
the relationship between global shape and choice of
the production system.
To statistically test the relationship between the
global shape of the utility function and the produc-
tion system employed, we conducted a logistic regres-
sion analysis with the dichotomy of CPS versus OPS
as the dependent variable and group membership
(EXP versus IPT) as the independent variable. In the
analysis, we controlled for the hog farmers’ age, edu-
cation, and debt-to-asset ratio.
Table 6 shows that the model signiﬁcantly improves
the ﬁt when compared to the null model, which
includes only an intercept (p < 0001; Nagelkerke
R2 = 028, correctly classiﬁed choices 75%). The
regression coefﬁcient of the shape of the utility func-
tion was clearly signiﬁcant (p < 0001) in the logis-
tic regression. The variables age (p = 018), education
(p = 044), and debt-to-asset ratio (p = 076) appeared
not to be signiﬁcant. These results again conﬁrm the
relationship between the global shape of the util-
ity function and production system employed. To
test whether a fundamental difference exists between
Table 6 Results of Logistic Regression in Which the Shape of the Utility Function (IPT vs. EXP) Predicts the Production System
Employed by Hog Farmers (OPS vs. CPS)
Production system employed by hog farmers: OPS (=1) or CPS (=0)
Risk-averse segment Risk-seeking segment
Total sample (c > 0) (c < 0)
B p B p B p
Shape of the utility function: 241∗ 000 260∗ 000 247∗ 000
(IPT= 1; EXP= 0)
Age −002 018 −004 051 000 090
Education 035 044 026 034 034 013
Debt-to-asset ratio −003 076 −023 008 025∗ 005
Fit statistics
Nagelkerke R2 028 030 031
Correctly classiﬁed choices 752% 732% 742%
Notes. The cutoff value in the misclassiﬁcation test is 0.500. An asterisk indicates that each parameter signiﬁcantly (p< 005) improves
the ﬁt when compared to the null model, which only includes an intercept. Nagelkerke’s R2 is similar to the R2 in linear regression
and measures the proportion of variance of the dependent variable (i.e., production system employed by hog farmers) from its mean,
which can be explained by the independent variables (the shape of the utility function, age, education, and debt-to-asset ratio).
The debt-to-asset ratio was measured on a 10-point scale with 1= debt-to-asset ratio 1%–9%, 2= 10%–19%, etc. The maximum
level of education was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from high school to university degree. Age is measured in years.
risk-averse (c > 0) and risk-seeking (c < 0) decision
makers, we ran separate logistic regressions for both
groups. The results were similar to those of the total
sample (see Table 6). No difference in the effect of
utility function shape shows up between risk-averse
and risk-seeking individuals. Interestingly, the debt-
to-asset ratio is signiﬁcant for the risk-seeking group,
a ﬁnding that is consistent with the ﬁnancial lit-
erature, which suggests that the expected costs of
ﬁnancial distress caused by a ﬁrm’s insolvency (i.e.,
high debt-to-asset ratio) inﬂuences that ﬁrm’s deci-
sion making, especially when that ﬁrm engages in
risky events (e.g., risk-seeking group) (Smith and
Stulz 1985).
In the previous analysis, a split was made between
risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals. To further
test whether the degree of risk aversion indeed does
not inﬂuence choice behavior, we ran a logistic regres-
sion analysis for the EXP group and the IPT group,
separately. Within the EXP group, the degree of risk
aversion (parameter c) was used to predict the choice
of a particular production system. No signiﬁcant rela-
tionship of parameter c on choice behavior was found
(p = 0109). Within the IPT group, no effect of degree
of risk aversion (assessed at the average cost price of
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2.90 Dutch guilders) was found on the choice of pro-
duction system (p = 0245) either. These results again
indicate that while the degree of risk aversion may
be important in explaining farmers’ trading behavior
(e.g., choosing between ﬁxed-price contracts or spot
market selling, cf., Pennings and Smidts 2000), more
structural organizational behavior is related to the
global shape of the utility function.
The EXP-IPT method indicates a strong relation-
ship between the global shape of the utility function
and organizational behavior, a result that does not
seem to change when further improving the utility
measurement by reducing measurement error.3 Next
we examine whether we ﬁnd similar results when
relating the global shape of the utility function based
on the two-piece utility function method to organiza-
tional behavior.
5.2. Shape Identiﬁed by the Two-Piece Utility
Method and Organizational Behavior
Examining the relationship between the shape of the
utility function and the decision maker’s organiza-
tional behavior translates for this method in exam-
ining whether the production system chosen by hog
farmers (OPS versus CPS) is related to the shape of
their utility function (i.e., fully concave, fully con-
vex, reversed S-shaped, and S-shaped). Table 7 shows
that farmers with a fully concave or convex utility
function predominantly employ the CPS (72.1% and
76.9% respectively). This ﬁnding conﬁrms the results
obtained from the EXP-IPT method that 70% of the
farmers described by an EXP function are associated
with CPS.
3 To ﬁnd out whether our ﬁndings were sensitive to measurement
error, we divided the total sample into three groups instead of
two: the EXP group, the IPT group, and an “ambivalent” group of
approximately 10% of the total sample that had shown minimal dif-
ferences in the MSEs for the EXP and IPT function (MSE< 0001).
If any of these “ambivalent” subjects had been misclassiﬁed into
either the EXP or IPT group based on their MSE values, remov-
ing them from the analysis should increase the percentage of cor-
rect classiﬁcation. Running the logistic regression analysis for the
“unambivalent” EXP and IPT groups revealed practically the same
results as described above (77% correctly classiﬁed instead of 75%).
These results indicate that MSE is a sensitive measure with which
to differentiate and classify respondents. Our ﬁndings appear to be
robust for the utility measurement.
Table 7 Relationship Between the Shape of the Two-Piece Utility
Function and the Production System Employed (OPS vs. CPS);
Percentages Computed Both Horizontally and Vertically
Loss Gain Global shape of
domain domain utility function OPS % CPS % Total %
cl > 0 cg > 0 Concave 279 721 100 n = 129
cl < 0 cg < 0 Convex 231 769 100 n = 91
cl > 0 cg < 0 Reversed S-shaped 666 333 100 n = 12
cl < 0 cg > 0 S-shaped 860 140 100 n = 100
Total 455 545 100 n = 332
cl > 0 cg > 0 Concave 238 514 38.9 n = 129
cl < 0 cg < 0 Convex 139 387 27.4 n = 91
cl > 0 cg < 0 Reversed S-shaped 53 22 3.6 n = 12
cl < 0 cg > 0 S-shaped 570 77 30.1 n = 100
Total 100 100 100 n = 332
Farmers with a reversed S-shaped, and particularly
those with an S-shaped, utility function predomi-
nantly employ OPS (66.6% and 86.0%, respectively).
These results again conﬁrm the relationship we found
using the EXP-IPT method, namely, that 80% of the
farmers having a utility function that could best be
described by an IPT function are associated with
employing OPS. In Table 7 (lower panel), we also
present the percentages computed vertically. It shows
that 57% of the OPS farmers have an S-shaped utility
function versus only 7.7% of the CPS farmers; 90% of
the latter have a fully concave or fully convex utility
function.
Our results provide evidence that there is a strong
relationship between the global shape of the utility
function and organizational behavior, a result that
does not seem to change when using different meth-
ods to identify the decision maker’s global shape of
the utility function.
5.3. What Is Driving What?
Having shown that the global shape of the util-
ity function is related to organizational behavior, we
speculate about the causal order of the effect: Does
the shape of the utility function affect organizational
behavior, or does the chosen organizational structure
dictate the shape of the utility function? We can-
not provide a deﬁnite answer to the causal order of
variables because our ﬁndings are based on a cross-
sectional analysis. We therefore speculate about the
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reason why the S-shaped utility function is related to
the OPS and the fully concave or convex function is
related to the CPS.
First, we reﬂect on the reason why the current orga-
nizational context may be driving the global shape
of the utility function. In the OPS, owner-managers
buy piglets and feed and sell slaughter hogs in the
cash market three to four months later. These owner-
managers are well aware of their production costs
because all their costs are direct expenditures. They
know their production costs and, hence, the price
levels in the cash market that constitute proﬁt and
loss. An S-shaped utility function with its point of
inﬂexion reﬂects this. In the CPS, owner-managers
raise their own piglets. As such, they do not incur the
expense of buying piglets, the costliest input in the
production process. For this reason, they tend not to
think in terms of gains and losses as often.
To test this idea further, we ran the logistic regres-
sion (see Table 6) the other way around; that is,
the production system (OPS versus CPS) became the
dependent variable and the shape of the utility func-
tion (EXP versus IPT) the independent variable. The
model ﬁt slightly improves from Nagelkerke R2 =
028 to Nagelkerke R2 = 031, which might be an
indication that contextual elements such as the pro-
duction system inﬂuence the shape of the utility
function.
The reasoning above is consistent with the recent
literature on constructed preferences, which argues
that due to limited processing capacity, decision mak-
ers often do not have well-deﬁned preferences, but
preferences are constructed on the spot by an adap-
tive decision maker (e.g., Bettman et al. 1998, Butler
2000). However, we cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that the shape of the utility function actu-
ally drives organizational behavior. Traditionally,
economists have considered utility functions to be
constant and individual speciﬁc; that utility maxi-
mization drives (optimal) behavior. It is very difﬁcult,
and it may even be impossible, to derive a formal
utility-maximization argument that shows that an IPT
farmer would ﬁnd OPS more attractive than an EXP
farmer. Instead, we provide some conceptual reason-
ing related to why the shape of the utility function
may affect organizational behavior. In the context
of our study, one could argue that farmers with an
S-shaped utility function think in gains and losses
strongly in the short run. The OPS production system,
in which they very rationally buy inputs (piglets and
feeds) and raise the piglets to be slaughter hogs, ﬁts
their thinking in costs and beneﬁts very well. The OPS
system even provides them with the option to stay
out of business when prices are low. In contrast, CPS,
in which the farmer is responsible for breeding the
piglets, requires a lot of expertise in this very special-
ized area of breeding. The breeding process also takes
a lot of time and requires thorough mental attention;
breeding processes are less mechanical, more variable,
and more difﬁcult to plan than the processes of rais-
ing hogs. A CPS farmer is therefore more akin to a
“real” farmer in the traditional understanding of the
word. Such a person may therefore think in gains and
losses in a more long-term manner and will perceive
farming as a way of life and a means to provide a
continuous stream of income, with a focus on wealth
in the long run (Willock et al. 1999). Consequently, the
CPS system will appeal much more to his/her way of
thinking than will the OPS system.
6. Discussion
The empirical results show that the global shape of the
utility function may differ across decision makers and
that this difference is linked to organizational behav-
ior. Structural behavior appears to be more strongly
related to the global shape of the utility function
than to the degree of risk aversion, which is based
on the local shape of the utility function. Another
way of looking at our results is in terms of refer-
ence points. Structural behavior appears to be more
strongly related to the presence of a reference point,
with the subsequent coding of outcomes into gains
and losses, than to the degree of risk aversion.
This interpretation of the occurrence of a reference
point can be substantiated further by noting that of
the owner-managers with a CPS production system
(those who breed their own piglets), practically all
(89%) exhibit a fully concave or convex utility func-
tion, and only 11% exhibit an S-shaped utility function
(see Table 5). Of the farmers with an OPS production
system (those who buy their piglets), 55% exhibit an
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S-shaped utility function and 45% have a fully con-
cave or convex utility function. Apparently, breeding
piglets hardly ever induces farmers to think in terms
of gains or losses. These farmers simply do not have
a clear reference point available. In contrast, buy-
ing piglets makes a substantial percentage of farmers
think in terms of gains and losses, whereas others
may decide to treat these costs as sunk costs and do
not act upon them.
Though we consider it behaviorally likely that the
organizational context is indeed driving the occur-
rence of a reference point, we also speculated on the
idea that the natural tendency to think in gains and
losses is driving the decision makers’ organizational
behavior (see §5.3). As our cross-sectional design does
not enable us to establish the causal order of effects,
further research by means of a longitudinal design is
required.
In a longitudinal design, one could also study the
stability of the utility function across time. Previ-
ous studies indicate that the stability of the degree
of risk aversion may be relatively low. In his study
of 253 farmers (growers of potatoes), Smidts (1997)
assessed risk attitudes by means of the certainty
equivalent technique in two consecutive years. He
found a signiﬁcant temporal shift in the risk attitude
towards less risk aversion in the second year; the
test-retest correlation with this one-year interval was
r = 045. Similarly, Schoemaker and Hershey (1992)
reported a test-retest correlation of r = 055 for the
certainty equivalence technique with a three-week
interval. We speculate here that the risk parameter
in the utility function (i.e., the local shape) is tem-
porally less stable than the global shape of the util-
ity function. Because our ﬁndings suggest that the
global shape is linked to more structural organiza-
tional behavior, decision makers will not easily shift
between S-shaped utility functions and a fully con-
cave or convex function. Only a structural change in
behavior would affect the global shape of the util-
ity function. Similarly, if the global shape of the util-
ity function drives organizational behavior, we would
ﬁnd frequent changes in organizational behavior in
the case of a temporally unstable global shape of the
utility function. Empirical evidence on the temporal
stability of the global shape can only be achieved in
a longitudinal design.
In this study, we applied two different methods in
assessing the shape of the utility function. The cor-
respondence between the methods in classifying the
decision makers was high. The method of ﬁtting a
two-piece utility function is quite ﬂexible, allows the
estimation of loss aversion, and discriminates organi-
zational behavior even slightly better than the EXP-
IPT method (see §5.2). However, the EXP-IPT method
does have the advantage of a more straightforward
ﬁtting procedure, and it requires fewer parameters
to be estimated. This approach also has the impor-
tant advantage that the reference point (the point of
inﬂexion) is inferred from the elicitations, instead of
imposed. The IPT-function also appeared to be ﬂexi-
ble enough to detect the large diversity of (reversed)
S-shaped utility functions in our sample of real-
business decision makers.
Recently, Wakker and Deneffe (1996), Wu and
Gonzales (1996), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), and
Abdellaoui (2000), amongst others, have developed
methods to remove from utility measurements the
bias due to nonlinear probability weighting. Although
there are large differences between individuals, a gen-
eral ﬁnding is that the probability of p = 05 (the p
we used in our lotteries) tends to be underweighted.4
Moreover, Abdellaoui (2000) showed that the ten-
dency to underweight p = 05 is somewhat larger for
gains than for losses, which conﬁrms the difference in
weighting functions for gains and losses, as proposed
by the Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kah-
neman 1992). These results would imply that by cor-
recting for probability weighting, we might ﬁnd the
S-shaped functions to ﬂatten; for gains the utility func-
tion becomes less concave and for losses it becomes
less convex. Thus, probability weighting may have an
impact on the shape of the utility function. In our anal-
ysis, not correcting for probability weighting implies
that some subjects currently classiﬁed in the IPT group
should have been classiﬁed in the EXP group. Con-
sidering, however, that our predictive results do not
4 Bleichrodt et al. (2001) conclude that the certainty equivalence
technique is not distorted by loss aversion, but it is distorted by
probability transformation. This bias is relatively small at p = 05.
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change upon removing the 10% of “ambivalent” sub-
jects, the effect of probability weighting will probably
not be large enough to affect our ﬁndings substantially.
To further test this effect of probability weighting on
our results, we added to the EXP group the 10% of the
IPT group (11 subjects) closest to EXP (based on MSE)
and then repeated the logistic regression. If these sub-
jects had indeed been misclassiﬁed due to probability
weighting, the predictive validity should increase. The
analysis shows that the percentage of correct classi-
ﬁcations decreased slightly from 75% to 73%. There-
fore, we conclude that taking into account probabil-
ity weighting would not have inﬂuenced our results
substantially. Similar results were found for the two-
piece utility function method.5 Finding an insigniﬁ-
cant effect of probability weighting on the relationship
between the global shape of the utility function organi-
zational behavior is perhaps not that surprising since
our farmers understand the 50/50 lotteries very well
as they reﬂect their daily decision-making domain:
selling hogs in the cash market in which prices can go
up or down with equal probability. Interestingly, in a
pilot study with a number of focus group discussions
with farmers, we observed that farmers truly think
that the chance of market prices going up or down
are equal. Often when talking about prices going up
or down they would say: “You know, it is hard to tell
whether the price will go up or down, it is like ﬂip-
ping a coin.” This notion is conﬁrmed in the ﬁnancial
literature (Schwartz 1997).
Recently, various researchers have demonstrated
the role of loss aversion in decision-making behavior
of consumers and investors (e.g., Hardie et al. 1993,
Odean 1998). These studies are done in a buy/sell
context; extending it to choices that involve organi-
zational behavior should be an interesting avenue to
explore. In a ﬁrst effort to account for loss aversion,
we included loss aversion in the logistic regression
5 To further explore the possible effect of probability weighting,
we used the cost of production as an indicator of the reference
point. Based on whether the lottery was played above or below the
reference point, we used wp= 042 (for gains) and wp= 045 (for
losses), found in studies by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). We then
estimated the utility functions again. It appears that although the
coefﬁcients in both the exponential and the IPT function change,
the classiﬁcation of hog farmers does not.
(see Table 6) for the segment of hog farmers with
an S-shaped utility function and examined whether
loss aversion contributed to the predictive validity. It
appears that loss aversion was not a signiﬁcant vari-
able in the equation and that the predictive valid-
ity did not change. These results suggest that loss
aversion is not (directly) related to organizational
behavior.
In management science, a distinction is made
between tactical decisions and strategic decisions. In
the light of this taxonomy, we may conclude that
the global shape of a decision maker’s utility func-
tion seems to reﬂect the manager’s strategic deci-
sion structure (e.g., choice of production process),
whereas the local shape of the utility function seems
to drive tactical decision making—e.g., trading behav-
ior; ﬁxed-price versus spot contracts (Pennings and
Smidts 2000). It would be interesting to study to
what extent our ﬁndings can be generalized to sim-
ilar structural decisions and to different decision
contexts.
An issue that needs to be addressed in future
research is the causal relationship between the global
shape of the utility function and organizational
behavior. Work is in progress using a panel of deci-
sion makers such that a longitudinal research design
is possible. Such a research design would also allow
us to study decision makers that switched between
organization structures (e.g., farmers switching from
OPS to CPS or vice versa) and investigate whether
the shape of their utility function changes (i.e., from
IPT to EXP or vice versa) after this change in
organizational structure. A challenge for this type
of research is that one needs a long time inter-
val, as decisions regarding organizational behavior
(e.g., production process employed) are strategic in
nature and hence are made for a relatively long time
window.
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